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BOOK REVIEWS
FREDERICK WILLIAM MAITLAND AND THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW. By JAMES R. CAMERON. Norman: University
of Oklahoma Press. 1961. Pp. xvi, 214. $4.00.
THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF
EDWARD I. 2D EDITION REPRINTED. By SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK,
BART., AND FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND. Washington, D.C.:
Lawyers' Literary Club. 1959. Two volumes, Pp. xxxviii, 688;
xiv, 691. $7.50.
I think it is fair to say that Frederic William Maitland (He spelled
his first name Frederic.) is the greatest legal historian of our Anglo-
American legal tradition. He outshines Pollock, Holdsworth, and
Fifoot in England and Holmes, Ames, Goebel, and Howe in this
country. The earlier English "legal historians" cannot always be
taken too seriously since they were generally repeaters or inventors
of traditions. We must, therefore, look a bit askance at some of the
utterances of Hale, Coke, and Blackstone. Their approach was not
very scientific.
Maitland's great contribution to historical enquiry is two-fold. He
dug out, translated, and edited medieval legal texts. He was also
able to give an accurate, comprehensive picture of the development
of English law in a concise and readable form. This was an enormous
achievement. His work demonstrates an apparently tireless energy of
mind and body (especially eyes) to seek out details hitherto un-
known. All this was coupled with a remarkable facility for making
accurate and readable generalizations. All of his generalizations, as
the author points out, have not always withstood the findings of
modern research. His conclusion with respect to the medieval borough
and village, the Romanist influence on English law, and the Eliza-
bethan religious settlement are cases in point. But Maitland set straight
a number of important misconceptions of earlier historians, and
much of his analysis serves as the foundation on which modern
legal-historical research is built.
This appreciation and criticism of Maitland's contributions to
legal-historical scholarship will be of particular interest to specialists
in legal and constitutional history. It will also serve to acquaint the
more general reader with some of Maitland's work of general in-
terest. This is not, however, a biography or even an effort to assess
Maitland's achievements systematically. The author merely treats of
particular topics of interest to Maitland, e.g., his contributions to
BOOK REVIEWS
our knowledge of early Parliaments, the origin of the common
law courts, the canon law in England, and the Year Books of Ed-
ward II, to mention a few. This is an introduction to Maitland and
his work. The exhaustive bibliography at the end of the book gives
a complete list of Maitland's works from which to choose further
reading.
Those who have tried unsuccessfully to acquire a set of Pollock and
Maitland's History of English Law will be pleased to know that it
is again available in a photographic reproduction of the second
edition of 1898. The work is, of course, largely Maitland's as Pollock
acknowledged in the preface to the first edition. The conventions of
the time demanded that the senior contributor be named first on the
title page, which is now amended to show the current publisher and
date of publication. The preface to the second edition is, however,
left in its original form and might mislead the unwary to believe
that there is new material not included in earlier editions. But
that is a small criticism of what is an otherwise admirable job
of reproduction.
Joseph W. McKnight*
THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW. By MORTON A. KAPLAN AND NICHOLAS DE B. KATZEN-
BACH. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1961. Pp. xi, 372.
$6.95.
The Cold War has frozen the world into a state of anxious shock
and uneasiness. Thermonuclear devices, missiles, and aircrafts in the
arsenals of the United States and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
have indeed made war "unthinkable." The Cold War, like the
weather, is complained about by all, but no one seems able to do
anything really significant about it. Continual crises threaten to
catapult the world into a cataclysmic holocaust. Everyone senses the
need of the rule of law in international affairs. Even the American
Bar Association in recent years has preached the importance of find-
ing a prescription for satisfying this need. The alternatives are
starkly clear: international law and order or internecine conflict and
destruction. The prognosis has been made. Will homo sapiens devise
and administer a prophylaxis in time? The disease poisoning the in-
ternational body politic is disorder. The prophylaxis is law and
order. How well do we understand the disease and its effects? The
book under review is an excellent introduction to the minimum
* Associate Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
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knowledge needed by informed laymen to begin an intelligent ap-
proach to the prescription.
This book is not a study of war and peace. Its objective is not so
Tolstoian in scope or grand in execution. Its title accurately reflects
what it is-an inquiry into and study of the political foundations of
international law.
It is fortunate that the book is the collaborative effort of a per-
ceptive political scientist and a sophisticated lawyer. This combina-
tion gives a balance of emphasis and perspective which might not
otherwise have been possible had only a political scientist or a
lawyer been the author. The interdependence of politics and law is
hardly appreciated on the national level, but surely no realistic study
of international law can begin without a sensitive awareness of the
political factors in international relations. Moreover, this book is
even of value to those who wish to further their knowledge of na-
tional politics and law, since it clearly restates the interrelation be-
tween law and politics-whether on the national or international
level.
The authors' purpose is to help scholars, statesmen, and the public
in general to understand contemporary problems in the chosen field.
A theory of systems in international politics is used as "an illumi-
nating theoretical perspective" (p. v). The two perspectives or frames
of reference utilized are the nineteenth century "balance of power"
system and the contemporary "loose bipolar" system. Although
these terms define a theoretical perspective, they are also intended
to be descriptive of the international political situation. The pos-
sibility, existence, and meaning of international law can be under-
stood only by a study of these political systems.
The authors state that "law exists, and legal institutions operate,
only in particular political contexts" (p. 3). A purest concept of
law is that in which "an impartial judge objectively applies a pre-
established rule to decide a controversy." A purest concept of politics
is "that in which the stronger interest or influence regulates the
social distribution of values" (p. 3). These concepts may define
separate and distinct disciplines for study, but in the world of reality
the operation and function of law and politics coalesce and inter-
penetrate. Although the international legal order is not primarily
vertical or hierarchical, as are national legal orders (e.g., the United
States, with a supreme court at the apex), but is horizontal (in
which various national tribunals of coequal authority announce
international law in the face of the limited efficacy of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice), there are, nevertheless, national and supra-
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national interests which support constraining international rules.
These interests are largely why international law is not only pos-
sible but exists.
The book is divided into three main parts. The first part, "In-
troduction," contains a perceptive, general analysis of the na-
ture and operation of the legal and political processes. Contrary to
the frequent statement that international law is illusory because
there is no international sovereign to enforce it, the introduction
makes a very significant contribution in asserting and practically
proving that there are interests or influences which support con-
straining international rules. Indeed, manifestations of the "balance
of power" system caused the development of much contemporary
international legal doctrine. The instability of this earlier system
was responsible for the transition to a "loose bipolar" system, which
had its beginnings with the cession of Alsace-Lorraine after the
Franco-Prussian War. The subsequent gravitational polarization of
political power in Russia and America after the Second World War
has caused a greater change in political organization and order than
in the international legal order.1 However, the developments in the
international political system necessarily foreshadow great changes
and the need for adjustment in the legal order. A historical survey
indicates that there are three periods which must be considered in
the development of the theory of international law: "Theory Before
1815 (roughly from the Renaissance to the Congress of Vienna):
Natural Law and the Law of Nations" (pp. 57-62); "From the
Congress of Vienna to the Second World War: Positivism" (pp. 62-
70); and "Theory Since 1914" (pp. 70-76). The authors observe,
"Law, by its very nature, conserves the values of a social system.
And when the values are themselves in transition, the system of law
gives way to political or quasi-legal activity" (p. 44). Values, in-
terests, and influences have changed in large segments of interna-
tional society. These modifications are established by a contrasting
analysis of the "balance of power" system and the "loose bipolar"
system.'
The second part, "The Doctrinal Framework," as evidenced by
its chapter titles, deals with the conventional doctrines and principles
of international law, that is, "The 'State' System: Orthodoxy and
Change"; "Recognition"; "Sovereignty and Territorial Rights";
"Jurisdiction"; and "Resort to Force: War and Neutrality" (pp.
'In chapter 6, entitled "The Pattern of International Politics," the authors enumerate
the factors and characteristics that distinguish the "balance of power" and the "loose
bipolar" systems.
' See source cited note I supra.
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83-228). In this part one gets the customary textbook treatment of
international law. However, the great value of the analysis is that
the authors relate the genesis of much of the doctrine comprising
the "balance of power" system and point out the unstabilizing im-
pact of the "loose bipolar system." A most incisive statement on
legal rules, be they national or international, is proffered:
The point to be kept in mind is the general one that legal rules pre-
scribe consequences to be attached by decision makers to specified fac-
tual conditions in order to promote policies. Therefore, the decision
maker must always inquire as to whether or not the particular facts
are those envisioned by the rule; one measure of this inquiry is whether
or not the policy encompassed by the rule will be served by its applica-
tion or by its rejection. In addition, as factual conditions change, the
rule itself may become outmoded and may no longer be suited to tho
policy envisioned and served when the rule was first formulated.
(p. 85)
It may be noted that the United States is committed to much
conventional doctrine. Although George F. Kennan's stricture that
we have been too legalistic in our foreign relations is somewhat of an
overstatement, certainly the present "loose bipolar" system does
strain many of our venerable customs. For example, neither the
United States nor the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the poles
in the "bipolar" system, can long tolerate a hostile enclave within its
bloc or sphere of influence.' Yet, since we are a law abiding nation
and believe that democracy depends upon the rule of law, we stood
behind the "democratic" though seldom-honored doctrine of non-
intervention in the Cuban invasion episode-much to our embar-
rassment and detriment. Thus our commitment to old doctrine in the
light of political reality and self-interest poses an agonizing dilemma.'
International law or doctrine does not operate or develop in vacuo.
The flesh of the law must grow and develop upon a skeletal struc-
ture. The authors observe, "It is commonplace that law is a process,
not a body of self-executing rules, and that the institutional frame-
work in which doctrine is created, invoked, and applied is of decisive
'Witness the Cuban invasion and the Hungarian massacre.
'Another problem that comes to mind is the classical or absolute theory of sovereign
immunity. According to this theory a sovereign cannot, without his consent, be sued
in the courts of another sovereign. This theory developed when governments entered into
business as a direct participant only very infrequently. But with socialism spreading and
states participating in and owning the means of production and commerce more and more,
this doctrine or theory has been modified. The newer or restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity has supplanted it in many countries. It recognizes sovereign immunity with regard
to sovereign or public acts (jure imperfi), but not with regard to private acts (jure
gestionis). The increasing practice of governments engaging in commercial activity made
it prudent for the United States to shift from the classical or absolute theory to the newer
or restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in 1952.
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importance in understanding the decision-making process" (p. 231).
Thus, the third and last part of the work, entitled "The Organiza-
tional Framework," deals with the sources, institutions, and organi-
zations of international law, towit, " 'Sources' of International
Law"; "The Institutions of International Decision Making"; "Supra-
national Organization of the Universal Type"; "Supranational Or-
ganization of the Bloc Type"; and "The Role of Norms in Interna-
tional Politics" (pp. 231-354). A fresh analysis is given to the tradi-
tional sources of international law, viz., treaties, customs, general
principles of law, judicial precedents, textbooks, and reason. The
authors apparently equate sources with techniques, for in the con-
clusion to the chapter on sources, the authors state:
There is a sense of frustration in discussion of the sources of law
that brings the student no closer to understanding the process. In fact,
we are talking here merely of techniques, the mechanics of process, and
this provides no clue for answering the question of what the legal norm
is in any given situation. (p. 264)
There is nothing to suggest that the various sources listed above are
haphazardly and indiscriminately resorted to as a technique of de-
cision. One or the other may seem more relevant, given a specific
dispute. However, whatever particular source is resorted to, decision
makers should recall that it is only a technique of decision and that
the other dimensions of a situation must be carefully considered.
The point is made with special effectiveness with regard to customs
as a source or technique of decision (pp. 246-57).
The section on institutions discusses the decision makers in interna-
tional disputes. They are the national and international -tribunals,
including the International Court of Justice at the Hague. Although
they may play a crucial role in international justice, like law itself
they are status quo oriented (p. 280) and are of limited value in a
world in transition.
One of the unusual characteristics of the institutional system is
pointed out. During the "balance of power" era many nations could
very appropriately offer their "good offices, mediate, or conciliate
international disputes."' But the "loose bipolar" system finds few
states sufficiently neutral to serve in such capacities (p. 274). Would
either America or Russia be willing for India to mediate the current
Berlin crisis? Of course, this is not the happiest example, for both
parties would be unwilling, not so much because they question India's
neutrality (America would probably question it most), but because




they have identified the claims in their statements of position with
their vital interests. These interests are relinquished only in the face
of superior force, thus the present saber-rattling stalemate.
The next two chapters deal respectively with the United Nations
and the bloc, supranational organizations such as NATO. Here the
authors indicate the value and purpose of the United Nations. In
the "loose bipolar" system the United Nations' principal roles are
"those of mediation, of conciliation, and of providing a forum"
(p. 309). They urge that we should not get impatient with the
United Nations. Blocs are a peculiar phenomenon of the "loose bi-
polar" system. They herald a decline in the importance of the
nation state (p. 316).' This decline will be a source of great diffi-
culty, because the emerging and underdeveloped nations are surging
forth on a high tide of nineteenth-century-like nationalism.
The treatise is concluded with a perceptive statement of the ad-
vantages of principled action. Nations are interested in more than
national values. One might even say that this is a commitment of
international Communism, at least in doctrine and theory. It cer-
tainly is not foreign to our heritage either.' But, perhaps more im-
portant, most nations have an interest in law and order. Order can
only be maintained if there are principles and rules for settling dis-
putes. However, "commitment to principle is not an advantage if
it is engaged in mechanically" (p. 345). Sociological jurisprudence
has already established this proposition in our national legal system.
The authors wisely and appropriately add, "A nation ought to com-
mit itself only to principles with which it can live"' (p. 345). In-
ternational relations are not devoid of principles. Internal motiva-
tions and external action are constraining influences upon national
action in the international arena. A better understanding of the
political foundations of international law and order will make it
possible, if there is the will to do so, to adapt principle and doctrine
to present international conditions. The authors have done much to
contribute to that understanding.
Kenneth S. Tollett*
'However, I should note that the present doctrinal schism in Communism between Red
China and Russia may foreshadow the cracking of ice at the Communist pole. "Poly-
centrism" is the word that has already been coined for this state of affairs in the Com-
munist Camp by the Italian Communist Leader Palmiro Togliatti.
" Neither the Marshall Plan, Point Four, nor the Alliance for Progress program were
solely motivated by self-interest, for frequently we say "enlightened" self-interest, which
connotes a generosity in foreign aid that does not result immediately in direct self-gain.
8 See note 3 supra and accompanying text. If Cuba granted Russia air bases and missile
launching sites, could we indeed live with the principle of non-intervention?
* Acting Dean, Texas Southern University School of Law.
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